Pag 6 Denaro falsa relazione con intelligenza. Pag 12 Argento 10, rame 20 oro 30 Pag 13 I primi il re di Lidia. Il Bisante per alcuni secoli fu esempio di moneta stabile. Pag 15 Le monete buone tesaurizzate le monete cattive circolavano.
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One of the things he is not, however, is a good economist. If his past efforts were not enough to justify this conclusion, then this, his latest book, certainly is. Galbraith begins with a short history of money—so superficial as to be almost worthless. He goes through the emergence of precious metals as a medium of exchange without a mention of Carl Menger , notes the development of paper money, the origin of the Federal Reserve System, and briefly discusses the great German inflation of the s.
Then, Galbraith gets around to his true purpose for writing this book, which is another protracted polemic on the virtues of John Maynard Keynes.
Galbraith condemns the Fed for not expanding the money supply and blames a reactionary fear of inflation on the part of business, Congress, and most economists.
His technique is to slur anyone who believes in gold or voices fear of inflation. For example, Galbraith makes a point of attacking Professor Edwin Kemmerer of Princeton by making it seem that he supported the gold standard only because he made a lot of money advising foreign governments on the subject. Galbraith also has contempt for the Austrian School and makes it appear as though Mises, Hayek, Schumpeter, Haberler, Machlup, and Morgenstern attack inflation and socialism only because they lived through the post-World War I inflation in Germany and Austria.
First, he admits that the economic policy of Hitler and Nazi Germany was essentially one of Keynesian economics. What had been the aberations of cranks and crackpots became now respectable scholarly discussion. Galbraith points out that the New Deal was not basically a Keynesian program. Rather, it was a disjointed hodgepodge of programs that reacted to individual problems but had no rational organization.
It was not enough, however, to have a theory that conveniently fit the times. Keynes also needed fellow conspirators. His influence spread to the generation of students at Harvard that brought the Keynesian gospel to Washington. Finally, Galbraith is forced to deal with the consequences of the Keynesian revolution. Once again he drags out price controls as the only way to stop the inflation generated by vast government spending and monetary expansion.
His devotion to this remedy probably stems not only from his inability to criticize Keynesian economics for causing all the problems, but also from his nostalgia for the Price Control Commission, where he served during World War II.
Perhaps he longs once again for the incredible power he possessed. We can only hope that he never gets it.
Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went
Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went